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Chapter 1 -. Introduction  
 
The thesis of this paper is that the Corporate Governance (CG) system in Mexico must change 
to a two-tier board system that includes employee representation in the supervisory board of the 
companies when the number of employees is equal or more than a 1000.  
The CG regulation in Mexico contained in the dispositions of the Mexican General Corporations 
Law as well as in the Mexican Securities Market Law, is shareholder primacy oriented, where managers 
of the company have fiduciary duties towards the shareholders, and the managers are held accountable 
for the share value1.  
In connection with the same, Mexican companies are mostly family owned, and the ownership 
structure is concentrated in a few controlling shareholders, which rarely find opposition to their interests. 
Furthermore, there is not a prohibition for shareholders to have seats in the management board of 
companies, and simultaneously be the CEOs of such company, which can lead to serious conflicts of 
interests, since the boards are supposed to monitor the executive officers.  
Consequently, there is not a clear separation between the duties of strategy and control within 
the company, nor a separation between the actors that carry out the control of the company, with the 
actors that hold the ownership.  
Throughout this work, it will be argued that the shareholder primacy model is outdated, and 
Mexico must shift to a stakeholder approach. This stakeholder approach must be implemented taking 
into account that the employees and the shareholders are the most important stakeholders within the 
company, therefore both their interests must be considered in the management.  
The above being said, since the employees bear a great risk in case that the company fails, in 
view that it would mean that they lose their main source of income.  
Regarding the same, in Mexico, employees only have representation through the labour unions. 
However, as it will be furtherly explained in chapter 3, labour unions are not an effective mechanism for 
protecting nor defending the labour interests.  
Alongside with this, poverty in Mexico has increased throughout the last decades, as a result 
of neoliberal policies that increased the polarization of social classes, making the rich richer, and making 
                                                 
1 San Martín, R. Durán and A. Valdés, ‘Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Performance in 
Mexico’ (2012) 5 International Business Research 12. 
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the poor poorer2. This situation, led to a drastic change in the political party that holds the power within 
the country, and for the first time in Mexico’s history, in 2018 a left-wing candidate was elected president 
(Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador).  
The main objective of Lopez Obrador is to achieve democracy and eradicate corruption3. 
However, if a real democracy is to be achieved, then all of the members of the society must cooperate 
in order to achieve it. Specially, the members of the society that are believed to be the most powerful, 
which in this case are the wealthy economic groups in Mexico.  
In regard of the above, it’s important to point out that the law is an organic concept that is 
created, reformed and altered within a certain social, political and economic reality. Therefore, it has 
become evident that in order to achieve harmony between the new political regime and the private 
sector of the economy, the CG system in Mexico must improve and adapt to the new political, social 
and economic background.  
All of the above being said, herein will be argued that it is necessary for Mexico to adopt a CG 
model that guarantees representation of the interests of employees, therefore, shifting from a 
shareholder primacy model to a stakeholder approach in the CG system. 
In order to do that, it shall be taken into account that Mexico, just as Germany, is a country 
whose industrial working sector plays an essential role in the economy4, and since labour unions have 
been failing to achieve well representation of the employees’ interests, a two-tier board system must be 
implemented.  
Throughout this paper it will be argued that the Mexican General Corporations Law (Ley 
General de Sociedades Mercantiles or LGSM) as well as the Mexican Securities Market Law (Ley del 
Mercado de Valores or LMV) and the Code of Best Corporate Practices must be reformed in order to 
implement a two-tier board system which includes employee representation in its supervisory board, 
when the number of employees exceeds 1000.  
                                                 
2 A. Morton, ‘Structural change and neoliberalism in Mexico: ‘passive revolution’ in the global political 
economy’ (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 631. 
3 Consejo General del INE, ‘Estatuto de MORENA’ (INE, 2018) 
<https://repositoriodocumental.ine.mx/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/100091/CGex201812-19-rp-
10-a1.pdf> accessed 05 June 2019. 
4 A Miranda, ‘La industria automotriz en México: Antecedentes, situación actual y perspectivas’ (2007) 
Contaduría y Administración <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=39522110>  accessed16 June 
2019.   
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This, in order to improve the negotiation possibilities of employees within the corporate 
structure, reduce conflicts, increase productivity, lower employee turnovers and layoff, but also achieve 
a better system of surveillance, and a separation of ownership and control within the company. All of 
these, while taking into consideration that the purpose of the company is to be sustainable, which 
implies that a company must be profitable while balancing the stakeholder's interests.  
The argument will be developed throughout four chapters, in chapter 2 of this paper the main 
CG theories and models will be analysed. 
It will include an analysis of the shareholder primacy model, the stakeholder approach, the 
enlightened shareholder and the views against each theory. In this chapter it will be demonstrated that 
the shareholder primacy model is obsolete and jurisdictions must develop ways of implementing a 
stakeholder approach.  
This chapter is necessary in order to set the base as to which CG systems exist and why the 
CG system in Mexico must change.   
Afterwards, chapter 3 will explain the CG system in Mexico and the legal framework around it; 
it will also include an analysis of the ownership structure of Mexican companies, a description of the 
economic and political context that led to the current socialist administration, as well as an explanation 
of why is it said that labour unions have failed their task of representing employees interests.  
This, in order to show that the CG system in Mexico must change to a two-tier board model, in 
order to implement an effective surveillance system, and to balance the interests within the 
stakeholders, but also for serving a greater purpose that is to achieve democracy within the country.  
Chapter 4 will contain the reform proposal to the LGSM and the LMV; it will also state why is a 
reform needed, and why will a two-tier board be beneficial for the country.  
It will explain which articles would have to be amended, or added, in order for the companies 
that have more than 1000 employees, adopt a two-tier board system, and include employee 
representation in the supervisory board.  
This chapter will also include the possible consequences and the impact of the reform.  
Chapter 5 will include the conclusion of the paper. It will contain a brief summary of the main 
arguments that supported the thesis; which states that the CG system in Mexico must change to a two-
tier board system that includes employee representation in the supervisory board of the companies 
when the number of employees is more than a 1000. 
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Chapter 2-. Corporate Governance Theories and Models  
 
This chapter will introduce the basic concepts of the corporation and the most relevant theories 
of CG. The argument developed in this chapter is necessary in order to demonstrate that the 
shareholder primacy model is out-dated and a stakeholder approach must be taken into account when 
developing CG framework. This chapter is needed since the Mexican model of CG is a shareholder 
primacy model.  
 
2.1 Theory of the corporation  
 
 The corporation is the dominant form of business organization, and it has been the prime 
vehicle of capitalism over the last century5. Moreover, as a prime vehicle of capitalism, corporations 
have become increasingly powerful, to the point that some corporations produce more wealth than 
some emerging countries (e.g. apple company has a market value of $961.3 billions of USD6, while the 
GDP of Venezuela was of $482.3 billions of USD in 20147), which mean that a greater focus needs to 
be posed in the way companies are governed and regulated; otherwise, weak and poor regulations in 
the private sector can lead to major financial crisis like the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  
There are different definitions of a corporation, Eisenberg defines it as a ‘profit seeking 
enterprise of persons and assets organized by rules’8 which seems like a basic definition of what a 
company is; however, the definition of corporation changes in regard of the nature attributed to such 
legal entity.  
 The concession theory, views the corporation as an artificial being, created by law, which arose 
as a delegation of state power, for it to become an instrument of economic growth9, this theory views 
                                                 
5 H. Butler, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Corporation’ (1989) 11 George Mason University law 
Review 99.  
6A. murphy et al,  ‘The World’s Largest public Companies’ (Forbes, 15 May 2019) 
<https://www.forbes.com/companies/apple/?list=global2000#1c244ff55355> accessed 14 of August 
2019.  
7 World Bank, ‘Data for Venezuela’ (World Bank, 2016) <https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=MX-
VE> accessed 14 of August 2019.  
8 M. Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia law Review 1461.  
9 D. Millon, ‘Theories of the Corporation’ [1990] Duke Law Journal 201.  
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the corporate status as a subsidy, because of the limited liability provided to the owners, which is a 
protection granted by the state in favour of the shareholders10; the aggregate theory views the 
corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders, and it rejects the fiction of the corporation as an artificial 
entity11; the real entity theory (also known as natural entity theory), views the corporation as a separate 
entity (independent from its shareholders and from the state) which is controlled by its managers12; and 
the contractual theory of the corporation, states that the company is a nexus of contracts, where the 
role of the state is limited to enforcing such contracts, through legal and constitutional protections13.  
In regard of these definitions, the variations that rise between them in regard of its nature, 
determine the way companies are treated in each jurisdiction, primarily as to define the intervention of 
the state in the private relationships within a company and to define the obligations attributed to the 
company.  
 In relation with the same, the microeconomic definition of company is an institution that uses 
factors of production (such as land, labour, capital and business skills) in order to produce wealth14; the 
way the factors of production are organized in order to produce wealth is called business strategy. On 
the other side, the way in which the relations within a company are regulated, and how decision-making 
is undertaken and controlled is called Corporate Governance15.  
 Corporate Governance (‘CG’) can be defined as the set of institutional arrangements, by which 
companies resolve disputes that arise from the interplay of stakeholders, by defining a clear structure 
of ownership and control16. Therefore, CG is the system by which companies regulate the relationship 
of their group of interests, specifically by defining in which way will the owners coordinate their tasks 
with the controllers of the company, in order to perform the business strategy.  
 In regard of the ownership and control of the company, it shall be pointed out that CG theories 
have evolved and with such evolution, the roles of ownership and control have been separated in order 
                                                 
10 S. Padfield, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory’ (2015) 6 William & Mary 
Business Law Review 01. 
11 Ibid.  
12 R. Avi-Yonah, ‘The cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on 
Corporate Social Responsability’ (2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 767.  
13 H. Butler (n 5).  
14 M. Parkin, Economy (11th edn, Pearson Education 2014) 224.  
15 ‘Corporate Governance’ Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law 4thedn 10 December 2015 Sweet and 
Maxwell. 
16 J. Pelayo and J. Sanchez, ‘The Institutional Context of Corporate Governance structure that 
Generates Collaborative Practices And Distinctive Competencies in Human Resources: A study of 
Mexico and Colombia’ (2013) 11 Competition Forum 102.  
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to improve transparency and performance, since the owners do not always have the skills to run a 
company, and skilled leaders do not always have the capital to start a business.  
 Berle and Means’ work17, states that the modern corporation has separated ownership and 
control, through the dispersion of stock ownership in large publicly traded companies. Therefore, share 
ownership, has become purely legal, and shareholders of a company no longer hold the control of such 
company. Rather, the ones with the control are the managers of the company, but the interests between 
the managers and the shareholders are conflicted, because, the managers (as agents) of the 
shareholders (principals) can make decisions for their personal interest that may be inconsistent with 
maximizing shareholder wealth18 which is the basis of the agency theory.  
 The problem of ownership and control has evolved through time, with the evolution of the 
corporation. As stated by Avi-Yonah, the corporation has its origins in Roman law, and it has had four 
major transformations: (i) first, the corporation as a separate legal person from its owners; (ii) second, 
the shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business corporations, (iii) third, the shift 
from closely-held corporations to corporations whose shares were widely held and publicly traded; (iv) 
and fourth, the rise of multinational enterprises19.  
 In relation with the same, before big corporations were developed, in the 19th century, the 
classical economic view of the corporation was of a small enterprise, directly managed by its owners, 
whom were motivated by the incentive of profits and hazard of losses in order to produce wealth20. 
However, with the evolution of the corporation, companies have grown to be in some cases larger than 
countries, and therefore, the previously mentioned conflict of interests between the management and 
the owners of the company has gained importance.  
In connection with the same, the agency theory, establishes that in large companies, the 
ownership is diversified in multiple shareholders, who transfer the authority of decision making to the 
managers (agents of the principal), who must maximize shareholder wealth. Moreover, this theory 
                                                 
17A.Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property cited in C. Daily and D. 
Dalton, ‘Governance through ownership: centuries of practice, decades of research’ (2003) 46 
Academy of Management Journal 151. 
18C. Daily and D. Dalton, ‘Governance through ownership: centuries of practice, decades of research’ 
(2003) 46 Academy of Management Journal 151.  
19 R. Avi-Yonah (n 12).  
20 R. Hessen, ‘The modern corporation and private property: A reappraisal’ (1983) 26 The Journal of 
Law & Economics 273.  
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states that the agent - principal relationship causes difficulties for the shareholders to obtain information 
in respect of the management of the business.  
In addition, this theory previews the existence of the agency problem, which means that 
managers may act opportunistically in order to pursue their own interests, at the expense of the 
shareholders21.  
Having said the above, the way the agency problem is addressed within a corporation, defines 
the CG model of such company. This, because one of the main characteristics of the corporation, is 
such separation of ownership and control, and therefore, the jurisdiction where a corporation resides, 
(or the corporation itself) must decide the CG model, in order to establish a clear way in which the 
interests of the management and of the shareholders will be aligned, in order for it to function, and in 
order for them to obtain a proper representation and defense of interests.   
Furthermore, there are theories that establish that the principals in the agent - principal 
relationship of the corporation are not only the shareholders, but rather other interest groups that are 
affected by the actions of the company. Therefore, related with the agency theory, other questions such 
as who should control the corporation? and for the pursuit of whose interests?22 must be addressed in 
order to define a CG model. 
In the following paragraphs, the main models of Corporate Governance will be analysed, this 
being the shareholder primacy model, the stakeholder approach and the enlightened shareholder.  
 
2.2 Shareholder Primacy Model 
 
The standard model of CG is the shareholder primacy model, which states that a corporation 
should be managed exclusively in the interests of its shareholders, and the market value of the share 
will be the principal measure of an effective management of the company23.  
One of the main proponents of this theory was Milton Friedman, who stated in the 1970’s that 
in a free enterprise system, a corporate executive is an employee of the business24. In other words, in 
                                                 
21 J. Pelayo and J. Sanchez (n 16).  
22 H.Mintzberg, ‘Who should control the corporation?’ (1984) 27 California Management Review 90. 
23 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman ‘The end of history for corporate law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439.  
24 M. Friedman, ‘A Friedman Doctrine’ New York Times Magazine (New York, 13 September 1970) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-
business-is-to.html> accessed 08 September 2019.   
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a neoliberal economy, managers of companies should seek exclusively to attend the interests of its 
shareholders, and no one else’s. This, because managers are making day to day decisions to run a 
company, using the shareholder’s money, and therefore, Friedman concludes that if the capital provided 
by the shareholders is used for different intentions rather than maximizing the share value, then the 
manager is acting unlawfully.  
 What this model of CG implies, is that managers have a fiduciary duty to run the business in 
accordance with the shareholders’ interests25, and the shareholders’ interests will generally be to ‘make 
as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of society’26. Ultimately, what this 
model intends is to maintain the control of the company within the shareholders’ power, through its 
agent that would be the manager.  
 This model is called the standard model, since it entails the idea that shareholders must control 
the corporation through its managers27, which is the way small companies are conducted, and is the 
starting point of CG; simply being governed by the desires of its owners28.   
Also, this theory is part of the underlying arguments of the agency theory, since it states that 
the agency problems begin when the manager as the agent of the principal, wants to attend his or her 
personal interests instead of the interests of the shareholders.  
 The shareholder primacy theory, arose with modernity and industrialization29, and this model 
establishes the main responsibility for all directors, to be held accountable for the share value30, and it 
may be enforceable by the shareholders (whom also have special monitoring rights such as voting).  
 The US has got this model of CG, and it has been developed through case law, in order to 
clearly establish the duty of loyalty and the duty of care that the managers of a company have towards 
the shareholders. The dominance of this model in the US, has got its explanation in the US post-war 
era, where the purpose was to make every citizen a stockholder, in order for them to buy shares in the 
New York Stock Exchange, and therefore companies would get capital from a widespread of 
shareholders, and shareholders would expect profits in return31.  
                                                 
25 N. Smith and D. Rönnegard, ‘Shareholder primacy, corporate social responsibility and the role of 
business schools’ (2013) 134 Business Ethics Journal 463.  
26 M. Friedman (n 24). 
27 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman (n 23).  
28 R. Hessen (n 20).  
29 E. Engle and T. Danyliuk, ‘Emulating the German Two-Tier Board and Worker Participation in U.S. 
Law: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm’ (2015) 45 Golden Gate University Law Review 69.  
30  R. Rhee, ‘A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy’ (2018) 102 Minnesota Law Review 1951.  
31 R. Monks and N. Minow, Corporate Governance (4thedn, Jon Wiley and Sons Ltd 2008) 99.  
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 Furthermore, the shareholder primacy model in the US is reflected in Dodge v Ford Motor Co32, 
which stated that the directors’ powers were to be employed primarily for the profit of stockholders.  
In relation with the same, the director’s duty of care as well as the duty of loyalty are relevant 
in this theory, since such duties are part of the fiduciary duty owed by the managers to the shareholders, 
and the breach of these duties by the director while making decisions in regard of the business 
management, will hold a director liable.  
 The duty of care, ‘implies that managers are expected to make decisions that ordinary, prudent 
individuals in a similar position would make under similar circumstances for the benefit of 
shareholders’33 while the duty of loyalty, implies that directors should promote the interest of the 
shareholders and must not put themselves in a position in which their interests might conflict with the 
shareholders' interests34.   
 However, regardless of the fact that under this theory, directors must act in good faith when 
carrying out business operations in order to maximize profit and regardless of the fact that shareholders 
hold a fiduciary protection that is enforceable against managers; directors do not always act in good 
faith, and shareholders do not always exercise their judiciary actions against managers.  
 Regarding the same, in the 2000’s different CG scandals led to tough criticism to this model. 
For instance, in 2001 and 2002, managers of companies in the US were inflating the earnings in the 
financial reports in order to gain more compensations, which led to the emission of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 200235.  
What happened was that with the intention of solving the agency problems of conflict of 
interests between the directors of a company and the shareholders, directors were being compensated 
with stock equity. Later, this led to a false inflation of the earnings within the reports elaborated by the 
managers, in order for them to obtain a bigger compensation36, and this inflation of earnings was 
reportedly present in hundreds and hundreds of companies within the US.  
                                                 
32 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).    
33 N. Smith and D. Rönnegard (n 25).  
34 ibid.  
35 G. Benston, ‘The quality of corporate financial statements and their auditors before and after Enron’ 
(2003) CATO Project on Corporate Governance Audit, and Tax Reform Policy Analysis No. 497 
<https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/quality-corporate-financial-statements-their-
auditors-after-enron> Accessed 06 November 2003.   
36 J. Coffee, ‘What went wrong? An initial enquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis’ (2015) 9 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1.  
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In connection with the above, the ENRON case was the biggest case of financial fraud and 
audit failure, where a company that was America’s most innovative firm for 5 consecutive years went 
bankrupt due to the manager’s share-value-maximizing unethical actions that led to financial fraud37.  
 Furthermore, another scandal that turned the glance to the ineffectiveness of the shareholder 
primacy model of CG, was the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which was caused by the profit 
maximization interest of investment banks, poor performance of credit rating agencies and disregard to 
stakeholder interests in the mortgage loan markets38.  
One of the causes of such crisis, was that lenders were not taking into account the debtors 
background, and started granting mortgages without studying the background without properly 
evaluating the payment compliance capacity of the borrower, later the borrowers stopped paying their 
debts, and then a domino effect followed: banks began to fail, the real estate prices raised, people lost 
their houses39, and then other countries went into recession period as well40.  
 Regarding such financial crisis, A. Greenspan stated that the risk management of financial 
institutions must be improved, since such risk management rested in the premise that owners and 
managers of such institutions would act in an enlightened way, which would lead them to maintain a 
monitoring position of the firm's’ capital and risk41.   
 In other words, the CG of financial institutions, relied in the premise that the shareholder 
primacy model worked perfectly, and that managers would always act in good faith, and the 
shareholders would monitor their actions, in order to ensure good business management. Needless to 
say, this premise was proven wrong, and directors do not always act in good faith, and shareholders 
do not always comply effectively with a monitoring function.  
 Having said all of the above, it has become clear that the shareholder primacy model is severely 
flawed and contains loopholes which are not always solved in the best way. This, because imposing an 
obligation of maximizing share value to directors, has led to management illicit actions. Consequently, 
                                                 
37 W. Bratton, ‘Enron and the dark side of shareholder value’ (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1275.  
38  J. Coffee (n 36).  
39 S. Nelson and P. Katzenstein, ‘Uncertainty, Risk and the Financial crisis of 2008’ (2014) 68 
International Organization 361.  
40 Mexico was severely affected by the 2008 financial crisis, and by 2009 the GDP decreased in a 6%, 
OECD, ‘Economic Studies of the OECD: Mexico 2011’ (OECD, May 2011)  
<https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/47905766.pdf> accessed 20 August 2019.  
41A.Greenspan, ‘We need a better cushion against risk’ Financial Times (London, 26 March 2009)  
<https://www.ft.com/content/9c158a92-1a3c-11de-9f91-0000779fd2ac> accessed 04 September 
2019.   
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in front of the failure of this system, new theories began to emerge, such as the Stakeholder approach 
theory.   
 
2.3 Stakeholder Approach  
 
A stakeholder is defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives’42, the term stakeholder was introduced in order to englobe 
the concept of any individual or group that maintains a stake in an organization, in the same way that 
shareholders hold a share43. This means that stakeholders of a business can be its employees, clients, 
suppliers, creditors, communities, governments and the environment44. 
 The stakeholder approach model was developed as a response of the weaknesses of the 
shareholder primacy model, and it was first introduced by R. Freeman, who called for a re-think of 
business organizations, in order to promote the idea that the corporation should have social and 
economic inclusion45.  
 This model, implies that businesses have a responsibility to attend the interests of all of their 
stakeholders46, since it recognizes that business organizations ‘control vast resources, cross national 
borders and affect every human life’47. Consequently, this model states that managers must take into 
consideration the interests of these stakeholders when running a business, being that they all share the 
risk of a corporate failure48.   
 The arguments in favour of this model, state that it reflects a more actual market practice than 
the shareholder value model, since big companies are increasingly required to balance social, economic 
and environmental components of their business, through Corporate Social Responsibility49; also, 
another argument in favour is that it is consistent with the actual view of the company, that states that 
                                                 
42  E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1st edn, Pitman 1984) 31-32, 46.  
43 Y. Fassin, ‘The Stakeholder Model Refined’ (2009) 84 Journal of Business Ethics 113.  
44 Ibid.  
45 A.Keay, ‘Ascertaining the corporate objective: an entity maximisation and sustainability model’ 
(2008) 71 The Modern Law Review 663.    
46 E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1st edn, Pitman 1984) in E. 
Freeman and others, ‘Stakeholder theory: The state of the Art’ (2010) 4 The Academy of 
Management Annals 403.  
47 R. Phillips, Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Ethics 11 (1st edn, Berrett-Koehler Publishers 
2003) 12.    
48 M.Mahmudur, ‘The Stakeholder Approach’ to Corporate Governance and Regulation: An 
Assessment’ (2011) 8 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 304. 
49 E. Engle and T. Danyliuk (n 29).  
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in order to achieve a sustainable long term focused existence, it must attain an optimum welfare 
distribution to all of its stakeholders, through a maximization of value of the company as a whole, and 
not only for the benefit of shareholders’ wealth50.  
Regarding the applicability of this model, it shall be pointed out that some jurisdictions have 
included stakeholder approach to its corporate law framework.  
Germany, through its two-tier board model, gives the employees the right to representation 
within the supervisory board, therefore including their interests in the decision-making of the business51. 
Also, the corporate law of Austria and the Netherlands establish that the company’s management has 
to steer the company in the interest of the enterprise as a whole52.  
Another example of incorporation of the stakeholder approach in the CG of the company is 
India, who established in its Companies Act 2013, the obligation of constituting a Stakeholders’ 
Relationship Committee, which resolves the grievances of security holders, as well as the obligation of 
constituting a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, which would be responsible for devising, 
recommending, and monitoring CSR initiatives of the company53.  
In relation with the same, in 2001, the European Union issued a Directive on Involvement of 
Employees54, which established that the European Company had to implement a negotiating body in 
their CG structure, which would represent the employee's interests in front of the managers, and also, 
such directive included different levels of employee participation rights.   
Therefore, an international effort of implementing a stakeholder approach in CG has become 
clear, through the support of legislative forces in different jurisdictions; but also, through the efforts of 
international organizations which are also pushing forward to an increasingly stakeholder-oriented view 
of the corporation.  
In relation with the same, the OECD stated that:  
 
                                                 
50 Ibid.  
51 K. Hopt ‘Comparative corporate governance: The state of the art and international regulation’ 
(2011) 59 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1.  
52Ibid.  
53 A.Choudhuri, ‘Effectiveness of board structure in India and Germany’ (2017) 16 The IUP Journal of 
Corporate Governance 46.  
54 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 Supplementing the Statute for a European 
Company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L 294/22.  
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There is a general agreement that in a global economy, businesses are often playing 
a greater role beyond job and wealth creation and CSR is business’s contribution to sustainable 
development. Consequently, corporate behaviour must not only ensure returns to 
shareholders, wages to employees, and products and services to consumers, but they must 
respond to societal and environmental concerns and values. 
 
 Therefore, the OECD supports the idea that corporations must take into account the 
implications of its activities, to the social concerns and values of the community. Another international 
organization that has supported the stakeholder approach as an effective form of CG is the International 
Standards Organization, through the ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility55.   
Having said all of the above, it becomes clear that the stakeholder approach has gained 
importance during the last decades, and the development of soft law as well as legislation efforts 
support the involvement of stakeholders’ interests within the company’s management. But on the other 
hand, this theory has been criticized, for the following reasons: (i) it is not clear whom shall the company 
consider as its stakeholders, and therefore it is unclear whose interests must the management take into 
account56; (ii) some stakeholders are more important than others within a company, but there is not a 
way to determine their level of importance; (iii) the theory does not establish who holds a judicial 
protection of their interests, in other words, there is no clear definition of the director’s responsibility 
towards the stakeholder of the company, and which stakeholders can exercise an action against them, 
(iv) there is not a clear established way in which director’s must balance the interests of the 
stakeholders57.   
Regarding all of the above, the development of a stakeholder approach that imposes an 
obligation for the company’s management to take into account the interests of other groups that were 
affected by the course of action of the corporation was needed, since the adoption of the shareholder 
primacy model was leading to irresponsible decisions to maximize profits, at the expense of the whole 
                                                 
55 This guidance established that the objective of social responsibility is to obtain sustainable 
development, and that a corporation must take into account the society in which it operates, since 
they depend in the health of the world’s ecosystems. International Standards Organization ‘ISO 
26000’ (ISO, 2010) <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en> accessed 12 August 
2019.  
56 Y. Fassin (n 43).  
57 A.Keay (n 45).  
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society. However, the material implementation of the stakeholder approach becomes difficult if the 
director’s duties towards the stakeholders are not properly narrowed and defined.  
 Also, it shall be pointed out that even when it is undeniable that a company exists within a 
society, and that the actions of the company affect other groups rather than just its shareholders, the 
objective of a company is to produce income in order to be sustainable, otherwise, the company that is 
not producing income is eliminated or acquired by other sustainable companies58. Therefore, it is 
concluded that a corporation must take into account the stakeholders' interests when running a 
business, however this shall be done in specific ways that do not affect the company’s business 
objective, since profit is also what makes a business sustainable.  
 
2.4 Enlightened shareholder value 
 
In light of the arguments against the shareholder primacy and the stakeholder approach model, 
a new form of CG that took into account the stakeholders interest, while prioritizing the profit making 
objective of the company emerged, and is called the enlightened shareholder value model. This model 
was introduced in the UK Companies Act of 2006, and what it implies is that for a company to ensure a 
long-term shareholder wealth, then it must pay attention to its stakeholders such as employees, the 
environment and local communities59.  
This model involves the duty of the directors of a company to balance the interests of the 
different stakeholder groups, building long-term relationships, in order to benefit the shareholders in the 
long run60.  
The underlying argument of this theory, is that although shareholder value must be ensured, a 
careful consideration of the interests of other stakeholders, will benefit the company as well61.  
The UK Companies Act of 2006 in its Section 172 (1) states that:  
 
                                                 
58 M. Parkin (n 14) 228.  
59 V. Harper, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate governance beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder divide (2010) 36 The Journal of Corporation Law 1.  
60A.Keay, ‘Tackling the issue of the corporate objective: An analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
enlightened shareholder value approach’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577.  
61 M. Mahmudur (n 48).  
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(1)A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard (amongst other matters) to: (a)the likely consequences of any decision in the 
long term; (b)the interests of the company's employees; (c)the need to foster the company's 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; (d)the impact of the company's 
operations on the community and the environment; (e)the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f)the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company.62 
  
Furthermore, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that ‘A successful company is led by 
an effective and entrepreneurial board, whose role is to promote the long-term sustainable success of 
the company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society63’. Therefore, it 
supports the idea that for a sustainable business strategy, stakeholders' interests and profit making 
should go hand in hand.  
  However, the problem with this model is that there is a lack of case law founded on a 
breach of the director’s duty to take into account environmental, societal, and community issues, as 
well as their employee's interests64. Which means that even though that a simple lecture of the section 
172 could be interpreted in the way that it holds a director liable for not taking into account the interests 
of the stakeholders, no application has been given to such subsection yet, and therefore, there is no 
way to prove whether or not such disposition has been effective in protecting the stakeholders’ interests. 
Although it shall be recognized the effort to include stakeholders' interests in UK corporate law.  
   
 2.6 Conclusion  
 
Now that the theories of the corporation have been explained, it becomes evident that in the 
present, there should no longer be a discussion as to whether or not the CG systems should adopt a 
                                                 
62 Companies Act 2006, s 172(1).   
63 The UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle A.  
64 A.Keay, ‘Having regard for stakeholders in practising enlightened shareholder value’ (2019) 19 
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 118.  
   
 
18 
 
stakeholder approach in which the management poses a greater focus in matters that affect their 
interest groups.  
The above is supported by the experience that shows that when a company’s management 
only seeks to maximize the share value, severe problems can occur, such as the financial crisis of 2008. 
 However, there has not been evidence that a stakeholder approach in its pure form can lead to 
sustainability, and overall, the corporation objective is to generate profit. Therefore even though the 
shareholder primacy model is an out of date model of CG, and stakeholder approach does not define 
clearly the manager’s duties, the conversation in regard of CG should no longer be about stakeholder 
approach vs shareholder primacy, instead, lawmakers and directors should be developing ways of 
implementing the stakeholder approach in the company law, taking into account the particularities of 
each jurisdiction.  
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Chapter 3-. Corporate Governance in Mexico   
  
Recently, CG in Mexico has gained importance, and in the last two decades, it has been 
suffering a series of reforms. One of the most important improvements in Mexico came with the 
introduction of the Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices65 (Código de Buenas y Mejores Prácticas 
Corporativas, hereinafter the ‘Code’). This Code was issued in 1999 by the Businessmen Council 
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial), a private organization composed by Mexican businessmen that 
works for promoting the free market and the corporate social responsibility with the objective of 
coordinating the policies and actions of companies and identifying specific solutions that contribute in 
developing public policies to increase economic growth and the level of competitiveness in Mexico66. 
Even though this Code was issued in order for it to be a best practice guide for all types of 
companies, it is not of compulsory application67, therefore, not all companies follow the CG practices 
contained in such Code.  
The legal framework around CG in Mexico is the LGSM that regulates all types of companies, 
and the LMV that regulates public listed companies. In relation with the same, it is important to mention 
that even though the Code is of voluntary application, the General Rules of the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(Reglamento de la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) establish that the public listed companies have a duty 
to report to the stock exchange the level of compliance of the listed company with the Code68. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the Code is compulsory for public listed companies, and as of today, 20 years 
after it was published, the main purpose of the Business Council is to increase the level of compliance 
of companies in Mexico with such code.  
In addition, it is important to mention that the most relevant corporate practices contained in the 
Code were later introduced in the dispositions of the LMV.  
However, before furtherly explaining the background of CG in Mexico, the general notes of 
company law in Mexico must be pointed out.  
 
                                                 
65 J. Pelayo and J. Sánchez (n 16). 
66 Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, ‘¿Qué es el Consejo Coordinador Empresarial?’ (Consejo 
Coordinador Empresarial, 01 July 2008) <https://www.cce.org.mx/que-es-el-consejo-coordinador-
empresarial/> accessed  12 August 2019.  
67 Introduction, Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices (CMPCM).    
68 Disposition 4.033.0 section XXI of the General Rules of the Mexican Stock Exchange (RBMV).   
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3.1 Private companies in Mexico 
 
A company in Mexico is defined as a legal entity constituted in accordance with the LGSM, that 
will be able to carry out the business activities needed in order to accomplish its corporate purpose69.  
The LGSM establishes different types of corporations: Limited Liability Stock Company 
(Sociedad Anonima or SA), Simplified Shares Corporation (Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada or 
SAS), Limited Liability Company (Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitida or SRL),  Cooperative 
Associations (Sociedad Cooperativa), General Partnership (Sociedad en Nombre Colectivo), Limited 
Partnership (Sociedad en Comandita Simple), and Limited Partnership by Shares (Sociedad en 
Comandita por Acciones). However, the most commonly established types of corporations are the SA 
and the SRL because of the benefit of limited liability that separates the company’s capital from the 
partner’s personal equity70.  
In regard of the above, even though both type of companies are limited liability companies, they 
have several differences.  
 
3.1.2 SRL 
 
The SRL is a legal entity that will be incorporated between the members (no less than two, no 
more than fifty71) that are liable only to the extent of their capital contributions. The capital of the 
company will be divided into as many equity quotas as the number of members. The member’s equity 
quota cannot be represented through negotiable instruments72 due to the fact that those equity quotas 
will not be transferable unless certain requirements are fulfilled. A member’s equity quota can only be 
transferred if the equity holders that represent the majority of the company’s equity agree on transferring 
such quota. Also, a new partner will be admitted only if such majority admits it73.  
                                                 
69 Article 4 of the General Law of Commercial Companies (LGSM).  
70 Subsecretaria de Competitividad y Normatividad, ‘Corporations in Mexico’ (Secretaria de 
Economia, August 2016) 
<https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/202845/Corporations..pdf> accessed 20 July 2019.  
71 Article 61 of the LGSM 
72 Article 58 of the LGSM  
73 Article 65 of the LGSM.  
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This legal entity was originally created to cover the needs of small companies74, however, it 
shall be pointed out that there is no statutory limit established in the LGSM to the equity that this 
company can hold. Therefore, the SRL can be as big (in terms of capital or in terms of employees) as 
it wants to be, as long as the members do not exceed the number of 50.  
The SRL will be managed by a sole manager or by a board of managers, which can be 
members and may be designated for an indefinite period75. The manager or the board of managers will 
be in charge of the company’s management as well as of the legal representation of the company76.  
The general members’ meeting is the supreme corporate body of the company, it must be held 
at least once a year and their faculties include taking decisions regarding allocation of profit, electing 
and removing the directors of the company, modifying the articles of incorporation approving the 
assigned equity quotas, approving new members, approving the increase or diminished to the 
company’s equity and taking decisions on regard of the liquidation of the company and any other 
faculties or obligations that the articles of incorporation grant to them.  
Every member has the right to vote, and they get one vote for every thousand Mexican pesos 
they invest in the company77.  
The fact that there is no limit to the size of the SRL Company is relevant, due to the fact that 
because of its legal nature, the LGSM does not establish an obligation to the SRL company to appoint 
an examiner or a surveillance committee. However, the members can opt to appoint one through the 
articles of incorporation78. This aspect of the SRL in Mexico has raised certain concern, because the 
lack of regulation to the supervision of this type of company gives the shareholders the widest liberty to 
establish their own duties and attributions79.  
 
3.1.3 SA 
 
                                                 
74M. García, Sociedades Mercantiles (2nd edn,Oxford University Press 1999) 239.  
75 Article 45 of the LGSM. 
76 M. García (n 74) 243.  
77 Articles 76-82 of the LGSM.  
78 Artlce 84 of the LGSM.  
79 M. García (n 74) 247. 
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On the other side, the SA is a legal entity established between at least two shareholders80 that 
are liable up to the amount that their capital contributions represent. The shares in this type of company 
may be transferred freely and there is no limited number of shareholders.  
The SA can be managed by a sole director or by a board of directors, which may or may not 
be shareholders81. Whether a single director or a board of directors manages, the SA has to be 
determined in the by-laws, and in case it is determined that a board will manage it, then they will act as 
a collegiate organ for the decision-making.  
In the SA, the director (or board of directors if it's the case) has the possibility of appointing an 
executive officer (or CEO) to be in charge of the day to day operation, who will be supervised by the 
sole director or the board of directors; but the appointment of such executive officer is not compulsory. 
In such case, either the sole director (or board of directors) and the general shareholder meeting will 
be in charge of appointing the officer or officers of the company which can also be shareholders82.  
The CEO of the SA will have the obligations and authorities expressly stated in the by-laws; it 
will not require the sole director to approve its decisions, as long as it acts within the scope stated in 
the by-laws, but the sole director (or board of directors) will be the legal representative of the company83.  
The directors of the company will have the responsibilities inherent to their mandate, as well as 
whatever responsibility contained in the by-laws.  
The directors in the board shall keep confidentiality regarding the information and matters that 
they have knowledge because of their position in the company, when said information or matters are 
not public (except in the case where the information is requested by the authorities). This duty of 
confidentiality will be in force during the time of their administration, and up to one year after its 
conclusion84.  
The directors in the board will be held jointly and severally responsible with the company: (i) of 
the genuineness of the capital contributions made by the shareholders; (ii) the compliance with the 
requirements provided by the LGSM and the by-laws in connection with the dividends to be paid to the 
                                                 
80 Article 89 of the LGSM.  
81 Article 142 of the LGSM.  
82 Article 145 of the LGSM.  
83 Article 146 of the LGSM.  
84 Article 157 of the LGSM.  
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shareholders; (iii) of the existence and maintenance of the company’s accounting and other books 
required by the LGSM; (iv) and due compliance of the resolutions of the shareholders85.  
The LGSM does establish a surveillance committee to the management of the company that 
will be composed by at least one statutory examiner, which could be a shareholder or an external 
person86. On the other side, nor employees nor a person with a family relationship with any of the 
directors can be statutory examiners87. 
The surveillance committee has the general obligation of supervising the management, and 
execution of the company’s operations; this includes asking the board of directors for a monthly financial 
report, being in charge of the annual report for the shareholders which will include their personal 
opinions on regard of the information that the management board prepared for the shareholders, 
attending to the general shareholders meeting and attending to the management board’s meetings88.  
The reason why two types of limited liability companies in Mexico exist, is because there was 
a need for a legal entity that established a basis of trust between the shareholders, due to the fact that 
the country has a high percentage of small and medium businesses that besides needing the separation 
from the company’s capital from that of the shareholder, needs to put a lock on the transfer of the 
shares89. Therefore, the SRL is a kind of small SA company that cannot transfer the shares as easily 
as the SA can.  
Due to its nature, only the SA can become a public company, which would be then called 
Sociedad Anonima Bursatil (SAB).  
 
3.2 The Mexican public listed company   
 
The LMV is the Act that regulates companies that are listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange. 
This Act establishes two types of SAs: the SAB and the Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad 
Anónima Promotora de Inversión or SAPI). The SAB is a public company that is listed in the Mexican 
Stock Exchange, while the SAPI is a SA that through a shareholders’ general meeting decided to adopt 
                                                 
85 Article 158 of the LGSM.  
86 Article 164 of the LGSM.  
87 Article 165 of the LGSM.  
88 Article 166 of the LGSM.  
89 M. García (n 74) 215 - 217.  
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the SAPI legal structure established in the LMV, with the purpose of encouraging investment and growth 
of the Mexican securities market90, however, the SAPI does not sell its shares in the stock Market.  
The SAPI was first introduced in the LMV in 200691, with the objective to promote investment, 
giving shareholders greater minority rights92. The purpose of the SAPIs is to eventually become a public 
company93, however, as it does not sell its shares in the stock exchange (yet), it is not subject to 
supervision by the National Banking and Securities Commission, neither is it obliged to publish its 
financial statements94 like the SAB.  
In Mexican Company law, different rules apply to public and private companies. The Mexican 
public company will be regulated by the LMV and the code of best corporate practices.  
 
3.2.1 Management of the SAB  
 
 The management of this type of company will be in charge of a management board and a CEO 
(or general director)95.  
The management board will be composed by a maximum of 21 members, from which at least 
the 25% must be independent96. The members can be designated for a definite or an indefinite period97.  
The management board will designate a committee of audit and a committee of best corporate 
practices that will assist them in their duties; both of them will have to be formed by at least 3 
independent members each (external auditors)98. These independent members have to be selected by 
their experience, ability and professional prestige, while also taking into account that they cannot have 
any conflict of interest99.   
                                                 
90 A Franck, ‘New Mexican Corporate Structure sociedad Anónima Promotora de Inversión’ (2007)13  
Law and Business Review of the Americas 231.  
91 V. Robleda, ‘Sociedades Anónimas Promotoras de Inversión’ (Colegio Mexicano de Contadores 
Públicos, 2015) <https://www.ccpm.org.mx/avisos/sociedades_anonimas.pdf> accessed 03 Augusr 
2019.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Article 19 of the LMV.  
94 A Franck (n 90).  
95 Article 23 of the LMV. 
96 Article 24 of the LMV. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Article 25 of the LMV.  
99 Article 26 of the LMV  
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Under no case, will an employee or a CEO of any other subsidiary of such company, be allowed 
to be a part of the committees that assist the management board100; neither will clients, suppliers, 
debtors or creditors will be allowed to be an external auditor of the management board101.  
 
3.2.2 The Management Board tasks 
 
The management board will be in charge of: (i) establishing the business strategy; (ii) 
monitoring the management and conduct of the society; (iii) approving the policies and guidelines for 
the use or enjoyment of the assets of the society; (iv) and it will be in charge of monitoring the 
compliance with the agreements of the general shareholders’ meeting (but this specific obligat ion can 
be carried out through the audit committee that assists the board)102. The members of the board will 
perform their duties seeking value creation for the benefit of the society103. 
 
3.2.3 The management board duties and responsibilities 
 
The members of the board have a duty of care and a duty of loyalty towards the shareholders. 
The duty of care requires the members to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company104. 
Regarding the same, the members of the board will be held liable: (i) if they refrain from attending to 
the board meetings and when due to their absence the meeting does not meet the quorum to be held; 
(ii) if they do not disclose relevant information to the company when it is necessary to the decision 
making, unless such information was confidential and they are legally bound to secrecy105.  
The duty of loyalty for the members of the board requires them to keep confidentiality in regards 
to the information and matters that they are aware of because of their position in the company, when 
said information is not public106.  
 
3.2.4 The duties of the CEO 
                                                 
100 ibid.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Article 28 of the LMV. 
103 Article 29 of the LMV.  
104 Article 30 of the LMV.  
105 Article 32 of the LMV.  
106 Article 34 of the LMV.  
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In a public company, the general director of the company will be in charge of the day-to-day 
operations, the conduction and execution of the business of the company and of the legal entities that 
it controls; subject to the guidelines and policies that the board approves107. It is also in charge of 
submitting an annual report to the general shareholders’ meeting, in regard of the operations of the 
year, the accounting of the company, the financial statements and the analysis of these108.  
 
3.2.5 Surveillance of the SAB 
 
 The surveillance of the company is attributed to the management board through the best 
practices and auditing committee109. The president of each committee will be required to submit an 
annual report to the management board, on regard of the company’s best practices and in regard of the 
audit carried out.  
 The best practices committee is in charge of assisting the management board in specific topics 
like monitoring the director’s actions, make observations regarding the performance of the relevant 
executives, the transactions of the companies with related persons during the reporting period and the 
remunerations granted to the CEO110.  
On the other hand, the audit committee is in charge of evaluating the company that carries out 
the external audit, and analysing its report, discuss the company’s financial statements with the general 
director, and discuss its approval with the management board, inform of any irregularities that it detects, 
etcetera. The annual report of this committee will include: the evaluation of the external auditor, the 
results of the analysis to the financial statements submitted by the general director, the follow up to the 
agreements of the general shareholders’ meeting, etcetera111.  
 
3.3 Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices  
 
                                                 
107 Artice 44 of the LMV.  
108 Article 172 of the LGSM.  
109 Article 41 of the LMV.  
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As it was above mentioned, the Code was published with the objective of creating a unified 
framework of CG for all types of companies in the Mexican jurisdiction. The Code includes 60 
recommendations in regard of management and best practices.  
In regard of management, the Code suggests that within the functions of management board 
of any company the following are included: ensuring that all shareholders receive equal treatment, and 
ensuring their access to the information; ensuring the generation of economic and social value for 
shareholders; promoting the consideration of the interests of third parties when making management 
decisions; ensuring honest management; monitoring and preventing conflicts of interest; appointing a 
general director and other high level executives as well as evaluating them and supervising their 
performance; supervising the operation of the company; establishing internal control and information 
quality mechanisms, give certainty and confidence to investors and interested parties about the honest 
and responsible management112.  
It is recommended that in the management board there is at least 25% of independent 
directors113. It is suggested that the board of directors should develop the functions of audit, evaluation 
and compensation of the general managers, finance, risk and compliance, through the creation of 
committees of assistance114.  
 
 
3.4 Background of Corporate Governance in Mexico 
 
Having analysed all of the above, it shall be pointed out that even though Mexico adopted new 
CG reforms that increased the supervision in public listed companies, adding external auditors and 
external members to the management board and implementing certain suggestions made by the 
Businessmen Council in the compulsory CG framework (e.g. the obligation contained in the LMV for 
the SAB to establish an audit committee and a best corporate practices committee); through a study 
carried out in 2014, it was shown that these better corporate practices did not translate in a significant 
better business performance115. 
                                                 
112 Best Practice 8 of the CMPCM.  
113 Best Practice 13 of the CMPCM.   
114 Best Practice 17 of the CMPCM.  
115A.Macías and F. Roman carried out a study in 2014 taking into account the return over assets from 
the company and their evaluation in the Tobin’s Q. A.Macías and F. Román, ‘Consecuencias 
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This, because as Macías and Roman state in their study, due to the high concentration of share 
ownership within the members of the founder families; even when the best corporate practices 
contained in the Code where applied in the CG of a company, the family members and shareholders 
continued to hold the power and control of the business, which translated in an obstacle in the 
improvement of CG in Mexico116. Also, another reason is because normally, the auditors of the 
companies, or the independent members of the board, have different types of relationship with the 
owners of the company, therefore, the surveillance may be compromised117.  
In other words, one of the obstacles to effective Corporate Governance in Mexico is the fact 
that the important companies in Mexico are family-owned and with large block holding shareholders, 
and both the strategy and control of companies, lie in the hands of the few dominant shareholders, 
which can hold positions as executive officers, examiners, and management board or directors board 
members, which therefore means that there may be no unbiased opposition of interests within the 
decision-making in the company.  
 Furthermore, the ownership structure of companies in Mexico, creates institutional problems 
that make it difficult to establish a system of CG that takes into account the interest of other stakeholders 
like employees, suppliers, clients, and not just shareholders; which creates tension in the Company, 
specially within the owners and their employees, since  employees do not have representation in the 
company’s management.  
This argument will be furtherly explained in the following section.   
 
 3.4.1 Evolution of CG in Mexico  
 
 Just as in the US and the UK, the development of CG in Mexico has been closely linked to the 
development of its stock market118, and it has prioritized the shareholders’ interests.  
The legal framework around the CG in Mexican Companies finds its starting point within the 
LGSM, which was published in 1934, and as it was shown in the above paragraphs, this body of law 
                                                 
económicas de la reforma de gobierno corporativo en un mercado de capitales Emergente, pruebas 
de México’ (2014) 81 El Trimestre Económico 357.  
116 Ibid. 
117 J. Manzanilla Gobierno Corporativo en las Sociedades Mercantiles (Thomson Reuters, 1st edn, 
Dofiscal Editores 2018) 20.  
118 G. Larrea and S. Vargas, Apuntes de Gobierno Corporativo (Primera Edición, Porrúa 2009) 8-21.     
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contains only the minimum requirements of Corporate Governance for private companies that are not 
listed in the Stock Market.  
 Then, in 1976 the first LMV was issued, which established a legal framework for listed 
companies and gave autonomy to the Mexican Stock Market.  
 Later, in 1988, a Code of Ethics was created for the compliance of companies within the 
Mexican Stock Market, but then it was replaced in 1999 with the Best Corporate Practices Code, which 
was elaborated and published by the Businessmen Council (CCE).  
The Best Corporate Practices Code was originally intended to be for the SAB’s Corporate 
Governance, but then, when it was issued, it stated that its practices were in order to achieve a good 
CG in every type of legal entity (but it was not of compulsory compliance). 
 In 2001, the LMV is reformed, and it included a great part of the Code of Best Corporate 
practices, in order to make it compulsory for public listed companies.  
 Afterwards, the modern principles contained in the Cadbury Reports and the Principles of 
Corporate Governances published by the OCDE were recognized in the second LMV of 2005, which 
abrogated the LMV of 1976, and it included the duty of due diligence and the duty of loyalty for the 
company’s directors, as well as minority shareholders rights119.  
 In the present, the basic conditions of structure within Mexican companies still hold the structure 
of a family business, where the ownership is highly concentrated, and within SAB’s there’s a common 
practice of issuing shares with no voting rights, which leaves the controlling shareholders with complete 
freedom of decision making120. 
 In regard of the above, it is important to mention, that since the first Code of Best Corporate 
Practices was published, the CCE has been the organization in charge of spreading and developing 
dispositions of soft law that ensure good corporate governance. 
However, it has become clear that Mexico’s efforts in Corporate Governance have only been 
directed to companies that are listed in the Stock Market, with no mandatory dispositions of best 
corporate practices for private companies; nor a mandatory procedure of audit for SA companies nor 
for SRL companies.  
                                                 
119 G. Larrea and S. Vargas, Apuntes de Gobierno Corporativo (Primera Edición, Porrúa 2009) 8-21, 
159-161.     
120 R. Chavarin, ‘Los Grupos Económicos en México a partir de una Tipología de Arquitectura y 
Gobierno Corporativos’ (2011) 78 El Trimestre Económico 193.   
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In other words, the development of CG in Mexico has been focusing in public listed companies 
in order to protect the shareholders, and in order to create effective mechanisms of strategy and control 
that ensure a greater return for shareholders. However, no attention is being paid in regards of corporate 
practices that ensure the protection of interests of other stakeholders like clients, suppliers, the 
community and most importantly, to its employees.  
 
3.4.2 The concentration of power in CG structures in Mexico  
 
One of the big issues of Mexico is the wealth concentration121, which is reflected specially in 
the business sector where Mexico has billionaire businessmen122, as well as private monopolies in 
telecommunications, cement industry, glass industry, banking and mining, dominated by powerful 
economic groups123 and by companies, which are mostly family owned124.  
This, whilst having a percentage of 41.9% of the country’s population living in poverty125 
according to official records of 2018, published by the National Council for Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social or CONEVAL).   
Additionally, it is important to mention that an institutional problem within Mexican companies, 
besides the ownership concentration, is the lack of counterweight in the balance of interests in the 
management of a typical Mexican company. Due to the fact, that it is a common practice in CG in 
Mexico, that the members of the management boards (in the SAB), or the board of managers/directors 
(in the SRL and SA) of companies, which are the ones with the obligation of supervising the executives 
of the company (which are normally part of the family that owns it) are related to the controlling 
shareholders through family ties, friendship and/ or business relationships126￼. 
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The aforementioned because in Mexico it is considered a matter of prestige, to be part of a big 
company’s management board, which leads to a complicated entrenchment of board members.  
Regarding the same, the most important owners of the companies usually have a seat in the 
Board of many other companies127; as exemplified in the work of C. Serrano and B. Husted, where it 
was shown that the most prestigious directors among the 90 largest companies in Mexico, seat on at 
least 10 different boards of those companies128.  
This company structure is normal in Latin-American countries, where family members retain 
the executive roles in the company, and the board members are also family friendly and lack 
independence129.  
However, Mexico is an important economy, being the third largest country in Latin America130, 
with big multinational companies, and an industrializing economy131 in which the working class holds 
an important political role.  
These, coupled with the fact that a big part of the country’s wealth is produced and distributed 
within a small part of the population has been generating historical political frictions between the working 
class and the business owners class, a generalized mistrust from the employees to the management 
of big companies132, which has led to discontent, increased employee turnover133 and strikes in the 
industrial sector134 that have been brutally repressed in the past135.  
 
3.4.3 Business environment in Mexico  
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1998) 244.  
128 C. Serrano and B. Husted, ‘Corporate Governance in Mexico’ (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 
337.  
129 L. Austen, J. Reisch and L. Seese ‘Actions speak louder than words, a case study on Mexican 
Corporate Governance’  (2007) 22 Issues in Accounting Education 661.  
130  N. Hamilton (n 123) 6.  
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Mexico is a country, which has a large number of private companies, classified as micro, small 
and medium companies (MiPyMes) and big companies; micro companies occupy 1 to 10 people, small 
companies occupy 11 to 50 people, medium companies occupy 51 to 250 people, and big companies 
occupy more than 251 people136.  
Micro companies in Mexico are very abundant, and they constitute 94.3% of the total private 
companies, and they generate 4 of every 10 employments137. However, Mexico’s big companies (which 
occupy more than 251 people) generate the most wealth, producing the 64.1% of the Gross Domestic 
Product of Mexico138.  
Mexico’s most important economic activities are the manufacturing industry and the sales of 
goods and services. According to the 2014 Mexico’s Economic Census, the manufacturing industry in 
Mexico produces 48.2% of the GDP and occupies 23.5% of the general occupied personnel in Mexico, 
and the economic activity of sales of goods and services occupies the 29.7% of the general occupied 
personnel in Mexico139. Furthermore, within the 1000 biggest companies in Mexico, the most recurrent 
type of company is the manufacturing company for the automobile industry140.  
In relation with the same, it shall be pointed out that since it is the big companies that generate 
the most wealth in Mexico, and have the greater impact in their stakeholders, especially because of 
their number of employees and their involvement in society, it is of utter importance that these type of 
companies adopt a stakeholder approach of CG, for them to take into account the interests of their 
employees, since it is these type of companies which have had important strikes in the past, in the 
manufacturing industry141.  
In relation with the above, it shall be pointed out that the economic group is a common type of 
business structure within the Mexican economy; and business conglomerates are a recurrent type of 
economic group in Mexico.  
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Business conglomerates are formed by a number of companies that are centrally controlled 
and attached through a production process, or the different companies within the conglomerate produce 
for related markets in order to benefit from economies of scope142. 
This type of business structure in Mexico normally has a small group of shareholders that have 
the ownership and control of the conglomerate, and regardless of the fact that this group of companies 
have a seemingly corporate structure, such groups are owned and managed as family business, and 
the family members hold around 60% to 70% of the shares143.  
 
3.4.4 Economical and Political background in Mexico  
 
Having said all of the above, it shall be pointed out that the family owned type of business 
organization has been present throughout Mexico’s history, and the concentration of wealth that 
generates tension within the country has also been frequent. As stated by Nora Hamilton:   
 
The concentration of economic power in Mexico can be traced to the colonial period, when 
small elite of landowners, mine owners and merchants controlled much of the wealth of the 
colony (...) The Socio-Economic elite changed over time, becoming more complex, but 
continuing to have a dominant role in Mexico’s economy.  
  
This means that, ever since colonial times, a constant struggle and cause for inequality in 
Mexico has been the concentration of wealth and power within a small group of people. This struggle 
has been stated as “Mexico’s permanent revolution”, because ever since the country’s fight for 
independence from Spain in 1821, the main objective has been to reach equality and justice between 
the Mexicans. This same drive was what led to the 1910 Mexican revolution against President Porfirio 
Díaz, when high levels of poverty, and the expropriation of peasant land, led the citizens to revolt144.  
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Regarding the same, Mexico´s changes in economic policies have traced the way to the 
creation of powerful economic groups, which started being the predominant form of business 
organization during the late 21st century145.   
But before the creation of powerful economic groups, around the 1950’s an Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) policy took place in the economy, in order to protect the market from the 
competition of imports, by introducing tariff duties on imports, but also through the establishment of 
manufacturing plants along the Mexico - US border, in order to favour exports146 to the US, which was 
known as Maquiladora programme. These industrialization efforts transformed the country from an 
agrarian economy to an urban semi-industrial society147.  
These efforts took place during what it is known as the Mexican Economic Miracle, between 
1940 and 1980, when the country grew at a 6% rate, and the industry grew from 25% of the GDP to 
34% of the GDP in 1970; also, the industrial labour force increased and the agricultural labour force 
declined148. During these years, one of the essential elements of the growth was the intervention of the 
state in the economy.  
For instance, controlling the railroads and the oil industry, or providing services to other 
companies and individuals at subsidized prices149. But the problem with this, was that Mexico started 
having a dependency on foreign borrowing in order to finance its projects (because the amount collected 
by taxes was not enough), and in 1970 the public debt increased to over $4 billions of dollars150.  
Then, around the 70’s, Mexico had an economy of expansion, and economic groups already 
dominated the private sector, these groups were mostly industrial firms, banks and real estate firms; 
most of them had participation of the government within their shares.  
Some of these groups began since the administration of Porfirio Díaz, like the Garza-Sada 
group in Monterrey city, that established a brewery and a glass factory in the beginning of the 20th 
century, and then established additional manufacturing companies within the steel industry. This 
                                                 
145 R. Chavarín (n 120).  
146 J. Moreno, J. Pardinas and J. Ros, ‘Economic development and social policies in Mexico’ (2009) 
38 Economy and Society 154.  
147 Ibid.  
148 N. Hamilton (n 123) 76 - 83.  
149 Ibid 74.  
150 Ibid 76 - 83.  
   
 
35 
 
economic group remains to this day, still being family owned, and by the 1970’s the grandchildren of 
the original founders were managing the firms. 151 
Regardless of the above, the economic miracle did not favour everyone, and high levels of 
poverty and unequal distribution of wealth remained.  
Another issue generated within the Mexican economic miracle, was that Mexico’s dependency 
to the US increased, as it became ‘Mexico’s major trading partner as well as the major source of foreign 
capital’152 (by 1973, the US direct investment in Mexico increased to $2.4 billions of dollars)153. 
In an attempt to fix the issues created during the ISI policy, President Lopez Portillo (whose 
administration period was from 1976 to 1982) started to exploit new oil reserves that had been 
discovered in Mexico, and the country became a major oil exporter, which led to an economic growth 
for the country. But only for a while, because by the end of Portillo’s administration, Mexico was in an 
economic crisis154.  
This crisis happened because Mexico became dependent to the oil exportation, and the oil 
prices dropped in 1981. Then, as a consequence of this, the peso was devalued and the government 
announced that it would no longer be able to repay its foreign debt155. 
This crisis devastated the Mexican population, and by 1982, the inflation rate was of 70%. The 
government took austerity measures, it cut back the social expenditures and around a million workers 
lost their job. This, forced Mexico to seek financial help from US banks, Europe and Japan, also from 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In the other side, the IMF demanded from Mexico 
a restructuring of its economy, in order to introduce economic liberalization policies, this “structural 
adjustment program” included the privatization of state assets, the reduction/ elimination to trade tariffs, 
removal of restrictions of foreign investment and a shifting to an economy of production for export156 
These effort of liberalization in Mexico continued during the administration of President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, and during this period, public enterprises formerly controlled by the government 
were privatized (examples of this are the telecommunications companies and the whole national 
banking system that was privatized)157.  
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Also, there was a reduction of the state’s intervention in the economy; Mexico became a 
member of GATT in 1995 and then the North American Free Trade Agreement was launched in 1994 
between Mexico, USA and Canada158.  
Regardless of the macroeconomic reform, and the fact that it was supposed to bring economic 
benefits to Mexico, the new model of liberalization did not benefit everyone, and it increased the 
polarization within social classes.  
By 1994, the income of the 10% of the wealthiest people in Mexico increased, while the income 
of the rest of the 90% of Mexico’s population decreased, and the levels of poverty in Mexico overall 
increased159.  
Finally, due to these amendments, the concentration of wealth in “economic groups” was 
propitiated. For example, during the 1990s, CEMEX (Cementos de México, SA. de C.V.), a cement 
company, controlled 70% of the cement production in Mexico, and VITRO, a business conglomerate, 
controlled 90% of the glass production; in other words, the privatization of certain industries led to some 
type of private monopolies160.   
All of these changes in the economy started creating class conflicts, discontent and protests. 
There were labour movements struggling for democracy, student movements that criticized the 
government’s actions and its legitimacy for not putting enough effort in reducing inequality, pro-
democracy movements started all around the country161. Overall, the Mexican population demanded 
for a change in the political party that held the federal executive party, since the same political party ran 
the presidency from 1930 to 2000162.  
Finally, a shift in the political party behind the federal executive was achieved in the 2000 
elections, when a candidate from the party called Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party or 
PAN) was elected as the president. However, this party lasted only 12 years holding the power (two 
presidential administrations, first by President Vicente Fox and then President Felipe Calderón). Since 
the administration of President Felipe Calderón was marked by severe violence, due to its “Guerra 
Contra el Narco” (war against narco) policy, which intended to end with the drug dealing problem within 
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the country, but as an outcome, his administration is considered the most violent of the last 50 years163, 
with the highest rate of intentional homicides, peaking in 2011, with an average of 22,281 intentional 
homicides per 100,000 people164.  
Afterwards, in 2012, a candidate from the PRI party was elected president; Peña Nieto’s 
administration was marked by corruption scandals that decreased his approval ratings165.  
Finally, in 2018, the presidential election marked a change in the political history of Mexico, 
when Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) was elected. This candidate is from the Movimiento 
Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement or MORENA) party, which has the objective 
of a peaceful transformation of the country in order to achieve democracy, and eliminate oppression, 
inequality, injustice, privilege and exclusion166.  
The election of 2018 was a result of profound discontent of the society with the government, 
because almost 50% of the population was living in poverty, and not enough actions were taken by past 
administrations to eradicate this problem. Alongside with the fact that ever since the 1980’s, a neoliberal 
model was adopted in Mexico’s economy; however, this model did not work out for everyone, and even 
though it increased the GDP, it did not diminish the degree of poverty in Mexico. All of these reasons, 
explain the discontent that led to the imminent election of AMLO, the left-wing presidential candidate, 
who got a total of 52% of the votes167.  
 Therefore, as a summary, Mexico’s economy has suffered great changes and amendments 
throughout its history, from an ISI policy with state intervention, to a market liberalization policy, to the 
election of a socialist party that has the objective of closing the gap of inequality with the Mexican society 
and achieving democracy.  
 
 3.4.5 Workers representation and discontent throughout Mexico’s history 
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 In relation with all of the above, in order to explain why is employee participation in the 
management of the Mexican companies needed, the discontent of this interest group must be 
explained.  
In Mexico, the protection of the employees' interests is attributed to worker unions. The right of 
the workers to form unions is recognized in the Federal Constitution168, which states that in order to 
defend their interests, workers have the right to form unions.  
Likewise, the Mexican Constitution states that the employees of a company will have the right 
to obtain an annual retribution derived from the company's profits called the "annual sharing in the 
profits". However, it expressly says that 'The right of the workers to participate in the annual sharing in 
the profits does not imply the faculty of intervening in the company's management'169.  
 Unions will be recognized as legal entities, if they comply with the requirements established in 
the Federal Labour Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo), and they will have the faculty of acquiring goods in 
order to accomplish their objective, which is to defend the workers’ rights and interests170. Nevertheless, 
it is important to point out that being part of a union is a right and not an obligation or a predetermined 
clause in the contract of employment, which means that not all of the Mexican workers have their 
interests represented through a union.  
The right to form workers Unions was acquired since the ending of the Mexican revolution in 
the end of the 20’s decade171, however, this form of representation has been widely criticized, since 
history has shown that Unions often represent the interests of the state, or the interests of the business 
owner, rather than the interests of the employees.  
 This, because historically, the most important worker unions within Mexico like the CTM 
(Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and the SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la 
Educación) which is the largest workers’ union in Latin America172, have been closely linked to the 
dominant political party, the PRI (Industrial Revolution Party) which we mentioned in the above 
paragraphs.  
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Such political party, usually controlled different worker unions throughout the country, by being 
colluded with their syndicate leaders173.  
 Furthermore, members of the worker unions, usually hold powerful political positions, for 
example, from 1979 to 1985 more than 90 of the members of the chamber of deputies were members 
of the CTM174 (being that the chamber of deputies has a total number of 500 members).  
Another example of the union’s influence in Mexican politics is that, during the elections of 
2006, the support of the SNTE led by the syndicate leader Elba Esther Gordillo, led to the election of 
the candidate Felipe Calderón (who was President from 2006 to 2012). During his administration, Elba 
Esther’s son in law became the Subsecretary of the Basic Education Commission in Mexico, and 
positioned her allies in the direction of the National Lotery, and the Comission of Social Security and 
Welfare in Mexico175.  
 All of the above proved that worker unions are powerful in Mexico, and they could hold pressure 
against the state in order to obtain better working conditions for their employees. But even though 
unions have the power to do that, no improvement in the salaries has been achieved by them, neither 
have they been effective in preventing massive termination of working contracts in the past or in 
improving the working conditions for the Mexican workers.  
 Another example of the union’s failure in defending the worker’s interests is explained by 
Zapata, who states that around 1987, Mexico was taking a privatization focus in their politics, and 
several companies that used to be state owned companies, where now being sold to private owners. 
These owners would then remove the past employees in order to establish new ones176, and the CTM 
did not make any action in order to frown the unemployment or defend the worker’s rights.  
 In relation with the same, the association of worker unions with political parties produces 
allegiances to the interests of the state and companies, while leaving employees feeling like their 
interests and welfare is not being properly represented177. 
 As stated by an interviewee in the Greer and Stephens’ study:  
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Given the way Mexican unions organize at many companies, it is quite possible that Mexican 
workers will not feel represented even while union and government officials are telling the 
company differently (…) Be aware that just because it is called a 'union' it does not necessarily 
function the way unions do elsewhere.178  
 
 In addition, another fact that illustrates the argument that worker unions do not really work 
effectively in order to pursue the employees’ interests is the fact that the minimum wage has lost two 
thirds of its purchasing power from 1982 to 2012179. Since the low wage of workers’ in Mexico has been 
used as an attractive offer to foreign investment, especially by using cheap labour in order to 
manufacture (low cost) goods in maquiladoras, which are later exported to USA180. This economic 
strategy may benefit Mexico as a whole, but decreases the quality of life of the workers.  
 All of the above has set a precedent into concluding that the current form of worker 
representation in Mexico lacks legitimacy and effectiveness in seeking the best interests of employees.  
Academics like G. Bensusán support the argument that in order to reduce the degree of social 
inequality in Mexico, it is necessary to establish new forms of representing the working class interests 
within companies, which in the long term, will stimulate workers to seek an increment in productivity, 
and will favor both the company and the employee181.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The Mexican company has a concentrated ownership structure, in which founding families hold 
most of the shares, and therefore, exercise the control within a corporation, without any significant 
counterweight in the company’s governance structure.  
This, because corporate law in Mexico has got a contractual view of the corporation, and a 
shareholder primacy model underlying its corporate laws, which hold some similarities with the US 
model, for example in the fiduciary duties of directors towards the shareholders in public listed 
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companies, as well as the share value maximizing objectives contained in the LGSM as well as in the 
LMV and in the Code of Best Corporate Practices.  
Also, another reason for this is the historical background that allowed the constitution of large 
conglomerates that hold great importance and power within the country, and are also family owned.  
Additionally, another important factor in the current business background in Mexico, is that the 
semi industrial economic model, has made cheap labour and cheap exports as one of its main 
competitive advantages in front of other economies; and this, alongside with the fact that employees 
are not well represented by labour unions, has increased tensions over the years, has made evident a 
lack of trust towards big company’s management and a general discontent of the working class.  
Furthermore, the poverty problems in Mexico, and the exacerbated inequality that has 
characterized Latin American countries, have made it evident that drastic measures must be adopted, 
in order to achieve social justice within the country’s population.  
Therefore, it becomes clear that the CG of companies in Mexico is inaccurate for properly 
regulating the Mexican company, since currently, the CG does not take into account the interests of a 
crucial group of stakeholders, which is their employees. Therefore, in order to achieve a model that 
implies justice and a balance of interests between the stakeholders, employee representation must be 
incorporated within the company’s management.  
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Chapter 4-. Implementation of a two-tier board in Mexico  
 
 Now that the CG background in Mexico has been explained, in the following sections the CG 
model in Germany will be analysed, in order to complete the argument as to why must the CG structure 
in Mexico must change into a two-tier board model that includes employee representation. Lastly, this 
chapter will include the reform proposal for company law in Mexico in order to implement the changes 
herein suggested.  
 
4.1 Germany’s CG model  
 
 The German system of CG is defined by its laws of codetermination (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), 
‘which involve a reallocation of corporate control giving nearly equal representation to labour and 
ownership in the board of directors’182. This implies that employees will have representation in the 
management of a company, and moreover, that their interests will be given the same degree of 
importance as the shareholders’ interests.  
Codetermination in Germany is mandatory for limited companies183, including the limited liability 
private company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung or ‘GmbH’) and the joint stock company 
(Aktiengesellschaft or ‘AG’).  
They are regulated by different Acts; the GmbH is governed by the Limited Liability Companies 
Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung or ‘GmbHG’) and the AG is 
governed by the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengezets or ‘AktG’).   
This codetermination obligation, entails a stakeholder approach in the CG of a company, in 
which the employees’ interests are recognized as a crucial element for the sustainability of the 
company.  
This CG structure has been criticized, since academics argue that the application of 
codetermination laws may lead to inefficiency in decision making as well as a costly implementation184. 
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However, despite criticism, this model has prevailed, and it led to prosperity within the German industrial 
sector, and even more so, it is argued that the CG system of Germany has enhanced investment185.  
Furthermore, this CG model has motivated reforms within the EU, in order to include different 
forms of employee participation within the company’s management186.  
It is believed that one of the main reasons why this model has been proven effective in 
Germany, is its particular socio-economic context, and a genuine belief that co-determination is socially 
desirable and economically beneficial, since it counteracted the inequality of bargaining powers 
between employers and workers187.  
In connection with the same, herein is argued that employee representation within the 
management of Mexican companies is needed, and a reform inspired in the two-tier board model of CG 
of Germany is proposed.  
Codetermination in Germany was introduced around the 1950’s as a response of labour 
democratization efforts around Europe after the First and Second World Wars. Additionally, 
codetermination was an outcome of the major strikes in the iron, steel and coal industry188; whose 
unions, through bargaining processes189, achieved the first codetermination model (which was only 
applicable to firms within such industry)190.  
Afterwards, the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965 brought a reform to the CG of German 
companies, which reflected a social inclusion view of the corporation191. This reform established the 
mandatory obligation of establishing a two-tier board model for stock companies. These boards would 
be the supervisory board (Aufsichtstrat) and the management board (vorstand)192.    
 
4.1.1 Two-Tier Board Model  
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 This model of CG separates management and control functions within companies, and 
establishes different duties for each board.  
 The management board is in charge of managing the affairs of the company193, and it will be in 
charge of the company’s strategic direction, manages the workforce, coordinates tasks and plans the 
operations194.  
The number and composition of the board varies according to the company’s size, 
codetermination rules, and its’ own by-laws195. The members of this board will be appointed and 
removed by the supervisory board196, and this board represents the company in and out of court.   
 On the other side, the supervisory board, is in charge of the control of the company. It will be 
composed by shareholders representatives and by employee representatives197.  
The main task of this board is to monitor the management board, as well as appointing and 
dismissing its members198.  
This board can exercise actions against the members of the management board, approve 
annual accounts, advise the management, and in general act as consultants of the management 199.  
 The supervisory board cannot directly be involved in the management; however, the by-laws of 
the company can establish specific decisions in which the approval of supervisory board will be 
mandatory200. Also, the members of each of the boards, cannot simultaneously be part of the other 
board201.   
Moreover, in addition to the public listed companies' obligation to establish a two-tier board 
model in their CG structure, the limited liability corporation (GmbH) also has an obligation of including 
labour representation in their management depending on the company’s size.  
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 In relation with the above, this CG system, regardless of its costly implementation, has worked 
and has been proven efficient, due to greater labour performance and transparency of governance that 
prevents frauds202.  
One of the reasons why this CG system has worked, is that Germans believe that corporations 
have a personal component to it, and its operations will produce a benefit for the whole community203. 
Furthermore, there is a general belief that cooperation rather than confrontation is an important value 
within the German society204.  
Another reason why this CG system works, is that the codetermination act was only achieved 
after long strikes of the whole steel industry sector; and after the enactment, workers within companies 
demonstrated an increase in commitment and sense of responsibility towards their firms205.  
Furthermore, another reason is that before codetermination, representation through unions was 
bureaucratic, and only served the purpose of negotiating industry-wide agreements, but did not have 
an actual power to achieve better working conditions such as a higher wage206.  
 The above being said, it shall be pointed out that all of these factors which led to the successful 
implementation of worker representation in the management of companies in Germany, hold similarities 
with the context in Mexico. Since Mexico, is a semi industrialized country, where the labour force 
occupies a crucial role in the corporation, but does not have an effective mechanism of representation 
of interests.  
 
4.2 Comparison between Mexico and Germany’s business context  
 
Currently, Mexico’s system of Corporate Governance is similar to the US, as it has a share-
value maximizing priority as the objective of the company; the directors have fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty towards the shareholders (and only towards the shareholders). The company is viewed as 
a nexus of contracts207, and other stakeholders’ interests are not taken into account within the 
company’s management.  
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However, even if this model may be suitable for the US, it is not suitable for Mexico.  Because 
a shareholder primacy model is only suitable for a country with a predominance of numerous widely 
held public companies with dispersed share ownership, such as the US or the UK 208.  
On the contrary, Mexico does not have numerous widely held public companies, rather, 
companies tend to have a concentrated ownership, with large family related block holders, big economic 
groups, and a smaller stock exchange, just as in Germany209.    
 In connection with the same, Germany as well as Mexico, are both industrialized (Mexico semi 
industrialized) countries, which have as one of its distinctive factors, the presence of large industrial 
firms. In these industrialized jurisdictions, workers within large manufacturing firms were perceived as 
exchangeable pieces in the production process, and therefore, the only purpose of the corporation was 
to offer greater yield to their owners210. Nevertheless, after the Second World War finished, the 
perception of the company changed to a social organization, that owed part of its value creation to an 
interaction of different factors within a society211.  
 In this terms, after the Second World War, the Unions within Germany pushed for participation 
in the management board, since the Union form of representation was no longer being enough to 
achieve proper defense of the workers’ rights. In that same sense, Mexico’s workers have been 
unsatisfied for decades, with Union representation, since they serve political interests rather than labour 
interests.  
 Furthermore, labour participation was introduced in Germany, in order to achieve industrial 
democracy, and in order to promote social inclusion212, that led to higher salaries and benefits for 
workers. This, because codetermination in Germany ‘appeared at the critical historical moments to 
resolve a significant market failure: it counteracted the inequality of bargaining power between 
employers and workers’213, in other words, codetermination placed a balance of interest between the 
corporation and its employees, since a simple employment contract couldn’t ensure the protection of 
interests of the workers.  
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This situation, which led to codetermination, is comparable with the current situation in Mexico, 
where workers do not have equal bargaining power in front of companies, and therefore, the contractual 
theory of the corporation that regulates stakeholders' interests within Mexican companies, is not suitable 
for regulating fair labour conditions in Mexico. 
Regarding the same, labour precariousness in Mexico has increased, as a result of: (i) the neo 
liberal economic policies introduced in the 80’s, and (ii) cheap manufacturing labour that has 
characterized Mexico’s semi industrialized economy214.  
Moreover, cheap labour has been a result of lowering the cost of hiring employees, to increase 
profitability for enterprises in Mexico. Which has been achieved through (unethical) corporate practices 
of outsourcing, by which a company, hires its employees through another company, in order to pay less 
social security contributions215.  
Furthermore, another fact that supports the argument that labour representation in the 
management is needed, in order to take into account, the interests of workers and achieve democracy 
is the fact that employees in front of big corporations hold very little or no power to defend their interests. 
Because even though in Mexico, the LFT establishes the right of strike216, this is only a formal 
recognition of such right, with no real application, since the low cost and easy interchangeable nature 
of labour in Mexico makes it effortless for employers to discharge employees that engage in union 
activities, or organize strikes217.  
All of these situations, alongside with the fact that the unequal distribution of wealth in Mexico 
has polarized the social classes, and has challenged legitimacy of democracy within the country218, 
led to a radical change in the political leadership with the election of a president with left-wing ideology.  
The shift from a right-wing directed political environment in Mexico, to a left-wing government 
has been a result of a general frustration of the majority of the population that has been affected by the 
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neo liberal policies that only favoured the financial capital and specific business sectors, while 
increasing the percentage of poverty, that by 2016 was in 50.6% of the population219.  
Therefore, if the goal of the current president is ‘to establish an authentic democracy’220; then, 
the introduction of a two-tier board model that promotes social justice and supervises the actions of 
management boards within the biggest companies in Mexico through labour representation in the 
management, becomes necessary. This, due to the fact that ‘democracy will never thrive if rich agents 
are able to subordinate citizens’221, which is the current reality of economic groups in front of the society.   
Regarding the same, for Mexico to achieve democracy without affecting the performance of 
companies nor their production; cooperation (instead of confrontation) should be the factor of change. 
Because a true change that leads to an overall welfare, with a reduced differentiation within social 
classes, can only be achieved through joint efforts of the political, legislative, private and citizen power 
within a jurisdiction.  
At this point, before introducing the reform proposal, it shall be pointed out that studies have 
been carried out in Mexico, in order to test whether or not participative management can have positive 
impacts. In these studies, it has been concluded that participative management programmes lead to 
greater performance, employee satisfaction, and bring benefits derived ‘from ideas coming from those 
who are closer to the production processes’222. Also, it generates a sense of commitment with the 
organization and long-term focused relationships223. 
 
4.3 Reform proposal 
 
This work proposes a reform to the CG framework in Mexico, in order to make it mandatory for 
public listed companies to divide its management and control tasks, through the implementation of a 
management board and a supervisory board. Also, this paper proposes to impose a mandatory 
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obligation of employee representation in the management, for SAs and SRLs (private companies), if 
they employ more than 1000 people.  
Before going further in the reform proposal, it shall be pointed out that is not within the scope 
of the present work, to exhaustively and precisely describe the way in which the reform would have to 
be carried out in order to make a shift from the current CG system to a two-tier board model that 
incorporates employee representation.  
Neither is it the objective of this paper to propose an exact copy or imitation of  the Germany’s 
model in the Mexican jurisdiction, since it is not advisable for a country, to exactly duplicate a determined 
legal system that was developed under a different socio political context, and also because Germany’s 
model of employee representation is a result of interconnection between codetermination laws224 and 
the company law framework; but such codetermination laws are far too specific and only suitable for 
such jurisdiction.   
That being said, this work proposes the implementation of some of the essential dispositions of 
German company law, that establish mandatory employee representation through a two-tier board 
model in CG. This, while making some connotations to the application in order for the proposed reform 
to attend the peculiarities of the Mexican corporate context.  
In connection with the same, the following paragraphs will explain the essential modifications 
to the CG system in Mexico, in order to implement a two-tier board model with employee representation.  
 
4.3.1 Reform proposal for the SABs legal framework  
 
 First, the LMV and the Mexican Code of Best Corporate Practices will have to be modified in 
order to change the current CG structure of SABs, which currently imposes an obligation of establishing 
a CEO and management board (which monitors the actions of the CEO), to a CG structure that 
establishes a management board, and a supervisory board.  
Furthermore, in the German system a simultaneous membership of the management board 
and the supervisory board is not permitted225, this prohibition is necessary in the Mexican CG legal 
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framework, since currently, duplicity of roles within companies is allowed, and very common, therefore 
a clear separation between the monitoring and the management function is recommended226.  
 Additionally, for the composition of such boards, the German Corporate Governance Code can 
be used as a model.  
This code imposes an obligation for public listed companies that have from 500 to 2000 
employees, to have a supervisory board, in which 30% of its members are employee representatives.  
If the company has more than 2000 employees, then half of the board will be composed by employee 
representatives and the other half will be composed by shareholder representatives, however, there will 
be one extra member of the board, which will be a shareholder representative and will hold the casting 
vote227.  
 Taking such disposition into consideration, it is proposed that for Mexico’s reform, the threshold 
should be of 1000 employees, due to the fact that implementing such reform would be very costly. 
Therefore, as a starting point it is recommended that such obligation is imposed only to companies of 
that size or bigger. This threshold is recommended, since the latest economic census revealed that the 
average of employees within the 1000 biggest companies in Mexico, is of a 1,816 for single-
establishment companies228, therefore, a threshold of 500 may be too low for the implementation of this 
CG structure.  
 Furthermore, in regard of public listed companies, an addition to the LMV will have to be 
implemented in order to establish the obligation for the general shareholder meeting to appoint their 
representatives that will be part of the supervisory board, in accordance with section 101 of the German 
Stock Corporation Act.  
Also, this paper recommends to establish the requirement for both private and public listed 
companies, of having a minimum of 3 members in the supervisory board, in order to avoid a deadlock. 
This in accordance with section 95 of the German Stock Corporation Act, since the LMV, currently does 
not establish a minimum of members for the management board.  
Another modification proposed, is the independency of the members of the supervisory board, 
since currently, the LMV does not require the independency of the whole board, and rather it only 
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requires the independency of 25% of the members, which compromises the independency itself, due 
to concern of the chosen independent members of losing the board seat and its associated benefits229.  
Moreover, it is proposed for the Mexican CG framework to implement the prohibition for 
shareholders representatives to be a part of more than 10 supervisory boards simultaneously, in 
accordance with section 101 of the German Stock Corporation Act. This being proposed, since currently 
it is a common practice for Mexican businessmen to be part of multiple management boards of public 
listed companies, which leads to ineffective supervision.  
  Lastly, it is proposed for Mexican companies with the obligation of establishing a supervisory 
board, to determine in their by-laws the specific requirements that will be imposed to members of the 
supervisory board, attending the particularities of the respective company.   
 
 4.3.2 Reform proposal for the SA and SRL legal framework  
 
Furthermore, in Germany, the Limited Liability Corporations are also required to establish a 
two-tier board model of CG if it has more than 500 employees, and employee representatives will hold 
one third of the supervisory board’s seats.230  
 Taking this into consideration, a reform to the LGSM is proposed, in order to modify the 
dispositions that establish the CG of SAs and SRLs, for them to have the obligation of establishing a 
supervisory board and a management board, when they have a 1000 or more employees. Also, in order 
to establish the obligation of implementing employee representation in the management, in private 
companies as well.  
 This being said, since currently the LGSM does not establish an effective organ of surveillance, 
nor a clear separation of management and control for private companies, which then is translated in a 
lack of balance of interests of the stakeholders of a company.   
Also, it is important to mention that this reform is needed, since the CG development efforts in 
Mexico, have only been directed to public listed companies, however, this is no longer acceptable, since 
the Mexican Stock Exchange only has 146 companies231, whereas the economic census of 2014 
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revealed that the 1000 biggest companies in Mexico, have an average of 1812 employees232. Therefore, 
it becomes clear that only a minimum percentage of big companies in Mexico are part of the stock 
exchange, but this does not mean in any way that private companies are not big, or that they do not 
need effective structures of CG.  
Also, it is argued that employee representation in the management of these companies is 
needed, in order to reduce the counter effects of outsourcing, that lower the social contributions that 
employees are entitled to receive, in terms of the LFT.  
   
Conclusion  
This reform is proposed in order to improve the surveillance systems in companies, achieve a 
stakeholder approach within CG, increase the quality of working conditions, and in the long run support 
the sustainability of Mexican corporations.  
 This model pretends to increase the protection of the employee’s interests within a company, 
(as this group is one of the most important stakeholder group within a company), at the same time that 
it increases productivity by ‘softening hierarchy and improving coordination of productive inputs through 
better feedback’233.  
Also, this reform is proposed in order to improve surveillance, independency of board members 
and a clear separation of responsibilities of strategy and control within Mexican companies.  
The implementation of this reform may bring disruptive changes and an initial resistance from 
businessmen. However, this reform is not of a merely ‘stakeholder approach’ nature, since the main 
objective is to align the interests (or achieve agreements) between the shareholders, the management, 
and the employees, in order to achieve greater productivity that increases profit.       
   
Chapter 5-. Conclusion  
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Having said all of the above, it has been demonstrated that the CG of Mexican companies must 
change.  
First, it was explained the need to implement a stakeholder approach that recognizes the 
employees as the most important stakeholder group besides shareholders.  
Then, it was shown that the ownership structure of a Mexican companuy, in trlation with the 
multiplicity of roles developed by the shareholders, the managers, and the executive officers, prevents 
the company of achieving an effective balance of interests as well as an effective mechanism of 
surveillance.  
Furthermore, it was observed that the current CG framework is only focused in public listed 
companies, and the LGSM only imposes minor requirements of CG for private companies. However, 
herein it was argued that private companies also need to adopt best CG practices, and they need to 
adopt a two-tier board model with employee representation in the supervisory board, when they employ 
more than a 1000 people.  
Moreover, it was shown that labour unions serve political interests, rather than labour 
protection. Therefore, it is concluded that a better mechanism of employee representation is needed.  
Lastly, it was argued that the current political context in Mexico, should lead to cooperation for 
establishing a democracy.  
In regard of all of these arguments, it is to be concluded that the adoption of two-tier board 
model in the CG framework in Mexico is needed, and will be beneficial for all of the stakeholders of a 
company, and for the country as a whole. 
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